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March 29, 1954

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Paramount in our European policy, quite properly, is a concern over the future orientati of Germany. This is more important than the accretion to Atlantic defense of any stated number of German divisions. Germany, and for present purposes I speak of the Federal Republic, vastly superior to satellized Eastern Germany in population, resources and political direction, will become polarized toward the West or the East. For many reasons, its attraction toward the Soviet orbit presents temptations in spite of the legacy of bitterness bequeathed by Soviet conduct. As long as Adenauer is Fedrep's leader (for the nature and person of his successor is unknown), there exists the possibility of fixing Germany in the framework of Western civilization in such a manner that its future alienation could be rendered almost impracticable. However, an increasing restiveness in Fedrep, due to the lack of a definite and implemented policy toward it in France, is making the danger of a Germany, floating in the Central European void, subject to the blandishments of two power blocs, a matter which requires a speedy solution.

As regards its orientation, three nations, including itself, have already pronounced themselves, through ratification of the EDC Treaty, in favor of its incorporation in the West; it is expected that a fourth, Luxembourg, will shortly do so. In spite of grievous past occurrences, the Benelux countries have decided to admit the Federal Republic as an equal partner in their military concerns. The Italians appear to favor a similar engagement, but for domestic reasons a decision in this respect will be deferred. France, the initiator of a program to heal the perennial causes of conflict in Western Europe, remains enigmatic in its intentions.

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It has frequently been said and believed that the United States should exercise no pressures designed to sway the French in their ultimate decision on this subject. Even the anxiety with which we view the dilatory tactics of the French Government and Parliament is construed by many, on both sides of the Atlantic, as an indirect interference in the affairs of a reliable partner, though its standing as one of the three great Western powers is almost entirely due to our espousal of its claims to leadership on the Continent.

I believe this attitude to be unrealistic, given the nature of French domestic political conditions. I would not advocate procedures that might be self-defeating or offensive to the legitimate sensibilities of a friendly ally. But I do not think our hesitancy to take a strong line with that ally, since we are merely reiterating our emphasis on the aims of a policy which is so evidently in our common interest, is justified. Some analysis, no matter how superficial, of France's present posture might be worthy of attention.

It is probably true that it would be a mistake for the United States at the present time to make any hasty judgments, arrived at by rational processes, on the French political situation. In spite of the French pride in logic, their behavior is not always in accord with it.

The general attitude toward politics in France is almost anarchistic — the population still follows the doctrine of 18th Century physiocrats that represents government as a necessary evil and that one submits grudgingly to its limited overlordship only in order to escape complete chaos.

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In our own country, Jefferson asserted that the repository of political wisdom was in the keeping of our agriculturists. To this day, in an economy which remains basically agricultural, where almost half the people of France derive their livelihood either directly or indirectly from the soil and where, in the National Assembly, as is the case in our own state legislatures, the interest of farmers is determining, narrow considerations, inspired by local politics, affect decisions even in the international field.

There is little doubt that the majority of Frenchmen have accepted as inevitable, for a variety of reasons, German rearmament. It is also true that this intelligent and realistic people believe the Germans should share in the common risk of defense against potential aggression from the East, personified in their minds by Soviet Russia. It is additionally true that the majority of Frenchmen, mindful of past history, believe it difficult to draw a distinction in fear between a future Communist threat and a rearmed Germany. Therefore, the hope persists in France that its citizens (because of a favored geographical position which will force the United States to continue to keep overflowing the cornucopia of foreign aid, and to maintain France as one of the three great Western powers) can preserve domestically a government which in the ordinary sense of the term does not govern, in the hopeful expectation that a fine day will arrive when these troublesome concerns of war, whether hot or cold, will be settled by men of good will in all nations agreeing upon a policy of general disarmament, as a consequence of which the dreaded consequences of man having discovered the principles and uses of atomic fission can be safely ignored.

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Under such circumstances, individual nations, and particularly France, would be able to afford the continued luxury of an asocial, confused, ineffective, unstable, unrespected, uncooperative, sensitive, economically-isolated system of government.

Only the French believe this happy state of affairs is possible of attainment. Only the French conceive that, by procrastination, one can avoid coming to grips with realities. This philosophy has, unfortunately, injected itself into foreign affairs. An escape from reality animates a tendency to refuse recognition of practicalities. Procrastination has become a policy; tomorrow may usher in a new day, where a new look will gloss over, or at least obscure, the demand for a firm decision. The uneasy combination of parties, based upon no political convictions, but the product of expediency, leads to compromise flowing from the least common denominator.

Without elaboring further on this theme, which, if one considers its historical and constitutional background, can be proved to have argumentative merit, one is irresistibly led to the conclusion that any qualms of the United States Government over applying "pressure" to France are, under existing conditions, unnecessary. By pressure I do not mean crass, ill-considered or ill-digested admonitions, but a constant and undeviating emphasis on a line of political conduct, founded upon policies intrinsically sound and forced upon the Atlantic complex by the actualities of current events.

What does this mean in relation to the EDC? Simply that, whether right or wrong, the U.S., the U.K., and the more responsible members of the

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Atlantic Alliance, determined to reject any revival of German militarism (connoting the creation of a national army and a general staff), have decided upon a method to employ the Germans in the defense of their own territory, and to associate them with the ideals of the Christian Occident, under solemn treaty obligations that impose upon this defeated nation the same military servitudes as we bear, without leaving it free again to threaten its partners with the menace of its uncontrolled and traditionally predatory expansionist national instincts.

If the decision we have reached about EDC, and our enthusiastic endorsement of it, is sound, then I think we should be prepared to use our influence and power — always tactfully — to overcome, as far as it is possible, French obstructionism. I am reluctant to suggest the commencement of a reappraisal of our European policy, but I think the appearance of our doing so would be influential at this time. As recent telegrams from Paris indicate, there is hope in the Mollet situation, and a chance of bringing about an agreement on the Saar. Even so, the French Government has postponed a debate on EDC until after the Easter holidays, and when it takes place it will be affected in considerable degree by the pendency of the conference on Indo-China at Geneva. Meanwhile, beset by uncertainties, we should, I respectfully advocate, lose no opportunity to demonstrate our impatience with procedural delays on the part of the French Government. Had we not already done so, I am certain the whole matter would already have been, as Mr. Molotov hoped, "consigned to the archives". A united front, and continued pressure by the U.S. and U.K., acting jointly, in ways not inconsistent with the dignity of France, should be exerted.

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